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REALIZING DIVERSITY, SUSTAINABILITY, AND
STAKEHOLDER CAPITALISM
Peter H. Huang ∗
ABSTRACT
Stakeholder capitalism conceives of capitalism with companies maximizing
their long-term value, while considering in addition to the interests of their
shareholders, also the interests of all their other stakeholders. Examples of such
additional stakeholders include customers, employees, communities, creditors,
competitors, society at large, and our planet. America today does not have
stakeholder capitalism. Instead, America presently has shareholder capitalism,
in which publicly held corporations only maximize their stock value to
shareholders.
This Essay analyzes proposals for the United States Securities Exchange
Commission to require that all reporting companies make periodic mandatory
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) disclosures of comparable,
standardized, and quantifiable metrics. These required, ongoing ESG report
cards would measure the diversity, sustainability, and ethical impacts of
companies on other stakeholders besides shareholders. In effect, this one simple
regulatory change means that reporting companies effectively will maximize
shareholder value subject to ESG constraints regarding other stakeholders’
interests, just as corporations now maximize profits subject to economic, legal,
market, scientific, and technological constraints.
This Essay analyzes how mandatory periodic ESG disclosures can realize
diversity, sustainability, and stakeholder capitalism. This Essay explains why
corporate greed as currently practiced under the notion of shareholder
capitalism is a championed and cherished part of American popular culture.
Finally, this Essay examines possible causes of the belief that corporate greed
and individual greed are socially desirable and even somehow virtuous.

∗
Professor and Laurence W. DeMuth Chair of Business Law, University of Colorado Law School, J.D.,
Stanford Law School; Ph.D., Harvard University; A.B., Princeton University. Thanks for helpful comments,
discussions, and questions to audience members of a virtual Emory Corporate Governance and Accountability
Review (ECGAR) Journal symposium on April 2, 2022 about ESG Implications and Legal Considerations,
Debra Austin, Reynolds W. Holding, Rebecca Huss, Greg Juge, and Ho-Mou Wu. A post based on the Essay,
Stakeholder Capitalism as ESG-Constrained Shareholder Capitalism, appeared on March 11, 2022, in the
Columbia Law School Blue Sky Blog on corporations and the capital markets, at https://clsbluesky.law.
columbia.edu/2022/03/11/stakeholder-capitalism-as-esg-constrained-shareholder-capitalism/.
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INTRODUCTION
Stakeholder capitalism conceives of capitalism with companies maximizing
their long-term value, while considering in addition to the interests of their
shareholders, also the interests of all their other stakeholders. 1 Examples of such
additional stakeholders include customers, employees, communities, creditors,
competitors, society at large, and our planet. America currently does not have
stakeholder capitalism, and instead, has shareholder capitalism, in which
publicly held corporations only maximize their stock value to shareholders. A
valid theoretical foundation for a stakeholder theory of the firm also remains
unresolved when there are many firms and heterogeneous agents. 2
Obligations to all other stakeholders are outside the purview of business law,
and instead governed by other areas of law, such as anti-discrimination law,
antitrust, civil rights law, consumer protection, employment and labor law,
environmental regulations, human rights law, privacy law, products liability, and
torts. This legal compartmentalization is what many business law professors
1
See, e.g., Klaus Schwab & Peter Vanham, What Is Stakeholder Capitalism? The Davos Agenda 2021,
Aug. 2021, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/01/klaus-schwab-on-what-is-stakeholder-capitalism-historyrelevance/. See also KLAUS SCHWAB, WITH PETER VARHAM, STAKEHOLDER CAPITALISM: A GLOBAL ECONOMY
THAT WORKS FOR PROGRESS, PEOPLE AND PLANET (2021).
2
Michael Magill et al., A Theory of the Stakeholder Corporation, 83 1685, 1721–22 (2015) (analyzing
the case of a single firm and homogeneous agents).
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teach law students (in the canonical Business Associations course) and believe
to be the right division of legal resources and responsibilities. 3
This Essay analyzes how to realize diversity, sustainability, and stakeholder
capitalism through mandatory disclosures, and why stakeholder capitalism is
preferable to shareholder capitalism. This Essay explains why corporate greed
as currently practiced under the notion of shareholder capitalism is a
championed and cherished part of American popular culture. Finally, this Essay
examines possible causes of the belief that corporate greed and individual greed
are socially desirable and even somehow virtuous.
I.

SHAREHOLDER CAPITALISM VERSUS STAKEHOLDER CAPITALISM

Only twenty-one years ago, two prominent corporate law scholars praised
“the recent dominance of a shareholder-centered ideology of corporate law
among the business, government, and legal elites in key commercial
jurisdictions. There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that
corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder
value.” 4 They declared that “triumph of the shareholder-oriented model of the
corporation over its principal competitors is now assured.” 5
And yet, intense debates are alive and well in today’s business, legal, and
public discourse on the future and meaning of corporate purpose. 6 For example,
Timothy Wu, currently serving in President Biden’s National Economic Council
as Special Assistant to the President for Technology and Competition Policy, 7
and the Julius Silver Professor of Law, Science, and Technology at Columbia
University Law School, 8 pointed out how shareholder capitalism “logically
incentivizes corporations to prevent government from acting in ways that might
be social welfare-maximizing. In retrospect, what was actually predictable in the
3
Jonathan R. Macey, ESG Investing: Why Here? Why Now? 19 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. (forthcoming 2022)
(analyzing ESG governance as the end of compartmentalization). available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3942903.
4
Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439
(2001).
5
Id. at 468.
6
See, e.g., RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE PURPOSE AND PERSONHOOD 186 (Elizabeth Pollman,
Robert B. Thompson, & Peter P. Weidenbruch Jr. eds., 2021). See also Yong-Shik Lee, Reconciling Corporate
Interests with Broader Social Interests—Pursuit of Corporate Interests Beyond Shareholder Primacy, Feb. 2022,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4024349.
7
THE WHITE HOUSE, White House Announces Additional Policy Staff, Mar. 5, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.
gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/05/white-house-announces-additional-policy-staff/.
8
Timothy Wu, Faculty Profile, Columbia Law School, https://www.law.columbia.edu/faculty/timothywu.
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year 2000 was that urging corporations to focus only on shareholder value would
yield the backlash we see today.” 9 Wu noted that a fatal flaw of shareholder
capitalism is that it overvalues “the ability and likelihood of government doing
that which the corporation is being asked to ignore.” 10
Wu split his normative critique of shareholder capitalism into two parts.
First, shareholder capitalism “ignores public choice theory and the obvious
incentives of corporations who are told to maximize shareholder welfare to
prevent the legal system from actually providing protections that might decrease
corporate profit. . . . And the shareholder value model is not independent of
governmental failure but one of its causes.” 11 Wu cited this very timely example
related to global climate change:
Take environmental protection. Say we recognize absolutely no
duty in corporations to take into account harms caused to the
environment and ask them only to maximize profit. If new
environmental laws will reduce long-term shareholder value by some
billions of dollars, it is in the interest of the corporation to spend
millions, if not billions, of dollars to prevent the passage of such laws
and try to weaken those already in existence. That’s elementary public
choice theory. 12

Second, shareholder capitalism “grandly overestimates the legal system and
what it can realistically do for people. Yes, the government is powerful, and laws
are commands backed by a threat of force. But to expect the law to fill in all the
gaps is to expect far too much.” 13 As another timely example, Wu considers
employment conditions:
The law, of course, can curb abuses and outliers by barring sexual
harassment or policing misconduct, like failures to pay overtime. But
to say the corporation has no ethical duties, and we’ll leave it to the
law to create the working conditions we’d like to see, is a recipe for
terrible work conditions once you accept the limits of the law. 14

The #MeToo viral social movement demonstrates how mere laws against
sexual harassment are not enough to prevent sexual harassment, partly because

9
Tim Wu, The Goals of the Corporation and the Limits of the Law, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG, Sept. 3,
2019, https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/09/03/the-goals-of-the-corporation-and-the-limits-of-the-law/
#comments.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
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government enforcement of laws is contingent on adequate funding and
motivation of government agencies.
Trees, oceans, and our precious environment do not, in general, have
standing to sue to legally protect themselves. 15 An additional reason that laws
are not always enforced is they are often very personally and professionally
costly for individuals to enforce. All legal rights that people have are real
options, in the sense that to exercise those legal rights, people may have to
pursue costly litigation. 16 As former Harvard law school dean and university
president Derek Bok said, “There is far too much law for those who can afford
it, and far too little for those who cannot.” 17
Partnoy has also cleverly demonstrated that shareholder primacy is illogical
by constructing “counterexamples that show how the notions that shareholders
should be assigned first priority, and that managers should maximize
shareholder wealth, are illogical.” 18 Specifically, Partnoy shows “that
economically equivalent firms, which should by definition choose the same
projects, will instead be led to engage in different behavior if they seek to
maximize shareholder value.” 19 Partnoy presents three “counterexamples
related to counterexamples related to capital structure, residual claimants, and
temporal challenges.” 20 Partnoy had raised some of his arguments in his earlier
work about financial derivatives. 21
II. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Do corporations have social responsibilities? In an often-cited essay, 1976
economics Nobel Laureate Milton Freidman 22 controversially argued that
corporations only have the social responsibility of maximizing profits for their

15
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? LAW, MORALITY, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (3rd ed., 2010).
16
Peter H. Huang, A New Options Theory for Risk Multipliers of Attorneys’ Fees in Federal Civil Rights
Litigation, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1943 (1998); Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of
Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 Stan. L. REV. 1267 (2006).
17
Derek Bok, A Flawed System, HARV. MAG., May–June 1983, at 38.
18
Frank Partnoy, Shareholder Primacy is Illogical, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE PURPOSE
AND PERSONHOOD 186, 186 (Elizabeth (Pollman, Robert B. Thompson, & Peter P. Weidenbruch Jr. eds., 2021).
19
Id. at 186.
20
Id. at 200.
21
Frank Partnoy, Financial Innovation and Corporate Law, 36 J. CORP. L. 799 (2006), and Frank
Partnoy, Adding Derivatives to the Corporate Law Mix, 34 GA. L. REV. 599 (2000).
22
The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1976, Facts, Milton
Friedman, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1976/friedman/facts/.
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shareholders. 23 Corporations engage in often contested political speech and
social activism. Corporations have great power. “Corporations kill people” 24 as
the corporate law scholar, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law,
Adrian A. Kragen Professor of Law, Frank Partnoy, 25 observed in exploring “the
role corporate law and governance might play in … two aspects of corporate
behavior—decision-making and oversight—on human life.” 26 Partnoy’s
thoughtful analysis considers “how should corporate law and governance
address tradeoffs between corporate profits and human life?” 27
III. MANDATORY ESG DISCLOSURES
This Essay analyzes proposals for the United States Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) to require that all reporting companies make periodic
mandatory Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) disclosures of
comparable, standardized, and quantifiable metrics. 28 ESG is the successor to
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), in the sense that while CSR considered
social accountability, ESG makes those considerations measurable and
quantifiable. 29
These required, ongoing ESG report cards would measure the ESG impacts
of companies on other stakeholders besides shareholders. In effect, this one
simple regulatory change means that reporting companies will effectively
maximize shareholder value subject to ESG constraints regarding other
stakeholders’ interests, just as corporations now maximize profits subject to
economic, market, scientific, and technological constraints. The SEC should
require that ESG disclosures are user-friendly by following the principles and
examples that Chip Heath, the Stanford University Graduate School of Business
Thrive Foundation for Youth Professor of Organizational Behavior, Emeritus, 30
23
Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAG. Sept. 13, 1970, http://umich.edu/~thecore/doc/Friedman.pdf.
24
Frank Partnoy, Corporations and Human Life, 40 SEATTLE UNIV L. REV. 399, 399 (2017).
25
Frank Partnoy, Faculty Profile, https://www.law.berkeley.edu/our-faculty/faculty-profiles/frank-partnoy/#tab_
profile.
26
Partnoy, supra note 24, at 400.
27
Id. at 400.
28
See, e.g., Commissioner Allison Herren Lee, Shelter from the Storm: Helping Investors Navigate
Climate Change Risk, Mar. 21, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/lee-climate-disclosure-20220321;
SEC, The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors, Release Nos. 3311042, 34-94478; File No. S7-10-22, Mar. 21, 2022.
29
See, e.g., Arend Kooij, ESG vs. CSR: How Should Your Brand Approach Showcasing Accountable
Values, Investisdigital, July 22, 2021, https://www.investisdigital.com/blog/esg-and-sustainability/how-are-esgand-csr-different.
30
Chip Heath, Faculty Profile, Organizational Behavior, https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/
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and Karla Starr, an award-winning business and science journalist with a
background in psychology, neuroscience, sociology, and system dynamics, 31
offer about how to make communication of numbers meaningful. 32
IV. MANDATORY DIVERSITY DISCLOSURES
Then Acting SEC Chair and Commissioner Allison Herren Lee gave a
speech titled Diversity Matters, Disclosure Works, and the SEC Can Do More
at the Council of Institutional Investors Fall 2020 Conference. 33 Current SEC
Chairman Gary Gensler stated in a House Appropriations subcommittee hearing
on May 26, 2021 that the SEC is considering requiring ESG disclosures, with
top priorities being reports about climate and human capital. 34 The SEC is
considering mandating “disclosures about the diversity of a company’s senior
management” among “diversity reporting requirements as part of a corporate
workforce disclosure proposal.” 35 The number of large, publicly-traded
companies in the S&P 500 stock index voluntarily making DEI (Diversity,
Equity, and Inclusion) disclosures in their required annual 10-K filings with the
SEC jumped from 2020 to 2021. 36 It was a low of 72, or about 14% of the S&P
index, in 2020 and was at least 402, or about 80% of the S&P 500, in 2021. 37
A drawback of the current increased DEI disclosures is the lack of
standardization in terms of location, quality, and quantity. 38 For example,
Facebook, now Meta Platforms Inc., disclosed employee diversity data for the
first time in its 2021 10-K. 39 That disclosure revealed that a mere 3.9% of its
workforce is African-American. 40 Nike, Inc. and Walgreens Boots Alliance Inc.
included three paragraph discussions of DEI efforts in their 2021 10-Ks. 41

faculty/chip-heath.
31
Karla Starr, https://kstarr.com/.
32
CHIP HEATH & KARLA STARR, MAKING NUMBERS COUNT: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF COMMUNICATING
NUMBERS (2022).
33
SEC Commissioner Allison Herren Lee, Diversity Matters, Disclosure Works, and the SEC Can Do
More: Remarks at the Council of Institutional Investors Fall 2020 Conference, Sept. 22, 2020, Wash. D.C.,
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/lee-cii-2020-conference-20200922.
34
Andrew Romonas, SEC Considering Corporate Disclosures on Diversity, Gensler Says, BLOOMBERG
L., May 26, 2021.
35
Id.
36
Andrew Romonas, S&P 500 Opens Up on Diversity After Floyd as Investors Seek More, BLOOMBERG
L., Feb. 11, 2022.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
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Nike’s 10-K did not reference diversity metrics it publishes elsewhere. 42
Walgreens’ 10-K filing to the SEC 43 referenced workforce diversity statistics on
its website, 44 based on EEO-1 filings that Walgreens submitted to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission about ethnicity, binary gender, and race
distributions of their employees. 45 The present hodgepodge of qualitative and
quantitative disclosures lacks comparability. A similar problem of
incomparability applies to ESG Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs). 46 Additionally,
disclosures that are not in or referenced by annual reports and 10-Ks filed with
the SEC lack the disciplining effect of potential shareholder lawsuits for
materially misleading disclosures.
A recent study 47 found that most job applicants care so much about potential
employers’ diversity and demographics to be willing to forgo more than $1,000
in salary to work at a more inclusive company. 48 Having a more diverse
workforce and board of directors may actually increase corporate profits because
people with diverse cultural identities, demographic attributes, ethnicities,
geographic origins, race, religion, sexual orientation, physical abilities, and
socioeconomic statuses provide diverse backgrounds, expertise, perspectives,
and viewpoints. More identity diversity is correlated with greater cognitive
diversity, 49 entailing “these five components: information (e.g., data, facts),
knowledge (e.g., understanding, structure), heuristics or algorithms (e.g.,
differential diagnosis, recipes), representations, which consist of perspectives
(e.g., alphabetical order or chronological order) and categorizations (e.g., west
coast, east coast, midwestern, and southern), and mental models (e.g.,
econometric models, weather forecasting). 50 A large body of empirical and
experimental research 51 finds that cognitive diversity “creates bonuses for

Nike, 2020 Representation & Pay, https://purpose.nike.com/2020-representation-pay.
Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc., Form 10-K, https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/
XRKSDKO1?ets=5.
44
https://www.walgreensbootsalliance.com/about-us/diversity-equity-and-inclusion.
45
https://www.walgreensbootsalliance.com/corporate-responsibility/report-resources.
46
Ryan Clement, Why Comparability is a Greater Problem Than Greenwashing in ESG
ETFs, 13 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
47
Jung Ho Choi et al., Do Jobseekers Value Diversity Information? Evidence from a Field Experiment,
Stanford Graduate School of Business Accounting Working Paper No. 4010, Feb. 2022, https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/
faculty-research/working-papers/do-jobseekers-value-diversity-information-evidence-field-experiment.
48
Maggie Overfelt, Hey, Employers: Job Hunters Really Want to See Your Diversity Data, INSIGHTS BY
STAN. BUS., Mar. 21, 2022, https://stanford.io/3N4VZH8 (reporting on the study).
49
Peter H. Huang, Boost: Improving Mindfulness, Thinking, and Diversity, 10 WM. & MARY BUS. L.
REV. 139, 139. 190 (2018).
50
Id. at 190–91 (citations omitted).
51
Id. at 190–94.
42
43
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organizations by improving decision-making, creativity, innovation, prediction,
problem-solving, and productivity.” 52
Does greater diversity of board members make a difference? A recent
empirical study finds that “the increased presence of minority directors on the
twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks—the quasi-governmental entities
responsible for evaluating many commercial banks’ lending to underserved
communities—is associated with greater lending to these communities.” 53 This
research involves a comparison group of twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks
with precisely identical “regulatory and supervisory functions in different
statutorily defined regions.” 54 This and other unique features of the design and
setting of this research provide consistent evidence of how more racially diverse
Federal Reserve Bank boards are “associated with Fed-regulated banks’
increased lending to underserved groups. That diversity can be consequential
even where, as with the Fed, the connection between the organization’s
leadership and policy outcomes is attenuated encourages greater scholarly
attention to the influence of diversity on outcomes in other public- and privatesector contexts.” 55 Mandatory corporate diversity disclosures are just one part
of realizing diversity. Other complementary non-corporate diversity efforts must
also happen. 56
V. MANDATORY CARBON FOOTPRINT REPORT CARDS
Global climate catastrophe is an existential threat for humanity and this
planet. The transformative power of capitalism can be harnessed to improve
environmental decision-making through carbon pricing to reflect negative
externalities, repealing energy subsidies, improving and strengthening the
National Environmental Policy Act, and refocusing government-funded

Id. at 139.
Brian D. Feinstein et al., Board Diversity Matters: An Empirical Assessment of Community Lending at
Federal Reserve-Regulated Banks, Jan. 5, 2022, https://ssrn.com/abstract=4000110.
54
Id. at 3.
55
Id. at 1.
56
See, e.g. Peter H. Huang, Put More Women in Charge and Other Leadership Lessons from COVID-19,
15 F.I.U. L. REV. 353 (2021); Peter H. Huang, Pandemic Emotions: The Good, the Bad, and the Unconscious—
Implications for Public Health, Financial Economics, Law, and Leadership, 16 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 80
(2021); ’Peter H. Huang, Resistance is Not Futile: Challenging AAPI Hate, 28 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER,
& SOC. JUST. 261 (2022); Peter H. Huang, Anti-Asian American Racism, COVID-19, Racism Contested, Humor,
and Empathy, 16 F.I.U. L. REV. 669 (2022).; Peter H. Huang, Put Even More Women and Minorities in Charge,
Symposium, 17 S. C. J. INT’ L. & BUS. (forthcoming).
52
53
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research towards environmental and Earth sciences, economics of our
environment, biological diversity, and climate engineering. 57
The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), 58 was established by the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 59 in part to
respond to emerging threats to the stability of the United States financial
system. 60 In response to President Biden’s Executive Order 14030, ClimateRelated Financial Risk, 61 the FSOC released a report in October 2021
identifying “climate change as an emerging and increasing threat to U.S.
financial stability. 62 That report included a recommendation for the SEC to
develop “climate-related disclosures to give investors and market participants
the information they need to make informed decisions, which will also help
regulators and financial institutions assess and manage climate-related risks.” 63
Already more than 2,000 corporations today voluntarily include carbon
emissions data in their published annual reports. 64 As is to be expected, for such
voluntary disclosures, there is a lack of comparability, standardization,
uniformity, and verifiability by third-party auditors. 65 For example, most
companies also in their self-interest omit what is known as Scope 3 data, 66 which
are “emissions are the result of activities from assets not owned or controlled by
the reporting organization, but that the organization indirectly impacts in its
value chain. . . . Scope 3 emissions, also referred to as value chain emissions,
SHI-LING HSU, CAPITALISM AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A PROPOSAL TO SAVE THE PLANET (2021).
The FSOC consists of 10 voting members who head the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the SEC, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, and the National Credit Union Administration, in addition
to the independent member with insurance expertise, plus five nonvoting members. Two of the nonvoting
members head the Federal Insurance Office and the Office of Financial Research/ The other three nonvoting
members are, a state banking supervisor, a state insurance commissioner, and a state securities commissioner
designated by their peers.
59
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376.
60
See Dodd-Frank Act § 112(a)(1)(C), 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(1)(C).
61
86 FR 27967.
62
U.S. Dept. Treasury, Financial Stability Oversight Council Identifies Climate Change as an Emerging
and Increasing Threat to Financial Stability, Oct. 21, 2021, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/
jy0426.
63
Id.
64
John C. Coffee, Jr., Climate-Risk Disclosures and “Dirty Energy” Transfers: “Progress” Through
Evasion, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG, Jan. 25, 2022, https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2022/01/25/climaterisk-disclosures-and-dirty-energy-transfers-progress-through-evasion/.
65
Stephen Comello et al., Transparency of the “Net-Zero by 2050 Club,” Stanford University, Graduate
School of Business Working Paper NO. 3996, July 18, 2021, https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/
working-papers/transparency-net-zero-2050-club.
66
Coffee, supra note 64.
57
58
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often represent the majority of an organization’s total GHG emissions.” 67 As
expected, the acronym GHG stands for greenhouse gas. 68 Many businesses,
including ExxonMobil, also “have made a pledge to move to ‘net zero’ carbon
emissions by a given date (usually 2050, but some much sooner).” 69
While preventing global climate catastrophe will eventually probably
require carbon taxes and regulating emissions directly, a more politically
feasible policy today is to simply require that reporting companies disclose their
carbon emissions in their 10-Ks and/or annual reports. 70 It is true that mere
disclosure of corporate annual carbon footprints does not necessarily mean that
such numbers will decrease. After all, disclosing annual CEO pay did not lead
to reductions in those numbers. As a former SEC Commissioner quipped, envy
is more powerful than shame among CEOs. 71
When England enacted in 2013 mandatory disclosures of UK-incorporated
listed firm annual carbon footprints, carbon emissions of those companies
decreased by approximately 8% over the next couple of years, in comparison
with a control group of similar European firms. 72 Moreover, there was no
adverse impact on the financial performance of the corporations reducing their
carbon footprints. 73 Finally, mandatory carbon disclosures provide valuable
information to asset managers, investors, and policymakers about how to
manage carbon transition risk, and even more importantly, to speed up the rate
of carbon emissions reductions in the future. 74
Of course, the details of carbon disclosures matter. For example, should
mandated carbon disclosures be only of “direct emissions” released by a
company’s own activities or also include the indirect downstream and upstream
emissions. Experts differ in their opinion of the best practice. 75 For another
67
EPA Center for Corporate Climate Leadership, Scope 3 Inventory Guidance, https://www.epa.gov/
climateleadership/scope-3-inventory-guidance.
68
EPA Center for Corporate Climate Leadership, GHG Inventory Development Process and Guidance,
https://www.epa.gov/climateleadership/ghg-inventory-development-process-and-guidance.
69
Coffee, supra note 64.
70
Lee Simmons, Want to Kickstart Climate Action? Make Companies Report Their Carbon Footprints,
Insights by Stanford Business, Dec. 2, 2021, https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/want-kick-start-climateaction-make-companies-report-their-carbon-footprints.
71
Personal conversation with SEC Commissioner Joe Grundfest.
72
Benedikt Downar et al., The Impact of Carbon Disclosure Mandates on Emissions and Financial
Operating Performance, 26 REV. ACC T. STUD. 1137, 1137 (2021).
73
Id. at 1137.
74
Patrick Bolton et al., Mandatory Corporate Carbon Disclosures and the Path to Net Zero, Centre for
Economic Policy Research Insight No. 111, Oct. 2021, https://cepr.org/active/publications/policy_insights/viewpi.
php?pino=111.
75
Coffee, supra note 64; Simmons, supra note 70.
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example, another possible way to arbitrage mandated carbon disclosure is to go
private. Again, experts differ in their opinion of the best practice to deal with
dirty assets going private. 76 The key is to reach a consensus as to how to measure
annual firm carbon footprints most accurately in a consistent, informative, and
relatively simple way. Finally, the SEC can and should learn from Europe’s
experiences with the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures
(TFCD). 77 On the positive side, the TFCD is “changing the corporate narrative
on climate change by recasting climate change as a strategic and financial risk
and no longer a peripheral ethical issue.” 78 On the negative side, for carbon
disclosures to influence corporate decision-making,
climate-related reporting must be given consequence not only by
regulators but also by market actors and other stakeholders. . . .
environmental law charity ClientEarth has reported numerous
companies to UK financial regulators in recent years for alleged
failures to disclose material information about climate-related trends
and risks in their annual reports. 79

There are likely to be lawsuits over materiality of climate-related
information omitted until the SEC and courts provide guidance. Private actions
for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5 provide another market disciplining
mechanism in addition to SEC criminal prosecution on reporting companies to
be truthful in making disclosures. Supreme Court Justice William Rehnquist said
about private securities fraud litigation: “we deal with a judicial oak which has
grown from little more than a legislative acorn.” 80
VI. STAKEHOLDER CAPITALISM AS CONSTRAINED OPTIMIZATION
A common and fundamental criticism about stakeholder capitalism is that
corporate actors cannot maximize the interests of multiple, conflicting,
stakeholders. 81 A version of this critique is corporate actors can, and so will,
camouflage the lack of shareholder maximization or disguise corporate
malfeasance by claiming to meet some other stakeholder’s interests. 82 Certainly,
it can be impossible to serve the divergent interests of multiple stakeholders.
Coffee, supra note 64; Simmons, supra note 70.
Megan Bowman & Daniel Wiseman, Finance Actors and Climate-Related Disclosure Regulation:
Logic, Limits and Emerging Accountability, in CRIMINOLOGY AND CLIMATE: INSURANCE, FINANCE AND THE
REGULATION OF HARMSCAPES 153 (Cameron Holley et al. eds., 2021).
78
Id. at 153.
79
Id. at 154.
80
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1974).
81
See, e.g. HOLGER SPAMANN ET AL., CORPORATIONS IN 100 PAGES 110 (2020).
82
Id. at 110.
76
77
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This is true indeed, though does not answer why shareholder primacy over the
primacy of any other stakeholders. Nor does this truism explain how to serve the
possibly incompatible interests of heterogeneous shareholders. Stockowners
differ in so many ways, including economic literacy, financial expectations,
income shocks, life-cycle considerations, liquidity, longevity risk, risk attitudes,
and time preferences.
Kenneth Arrow, 1972 Economics Nobel Laureate, 83 proved his famous
impossibility theorem about difficulties in aggregating individual preference
orderings into a social preference orderings. 84 Arrow was motivated partly by
his desire to construct a theory of the form reconciling the conflicting
preferences of a firm’s heterogeneous shareholder into a single objective
function for that firm. 85 This is ironic because influential corporate law and
economics scholars have quite ominously stated that when “a firm makes
inconsistent choices, it is likely to self-destruct” 86 by citing 87 Arrow’s
impossibility theorem to mistakenly justify shareholder primacy. 88 Another
corporate law scholar 89 misapplies Arrow’s theoretical work about the tradeoff
in organizations between responsibility (or accountability) and authority, 90 in a
failed attempt to justify a competing corporate law theory of director primacy. 91
Mathematically, a multiple-variable, or vector, as opposed to a single
variable, or scalar, objective function cannot necessarily be maximized. This is
because there is a well-known ordering over scalars, while there is no ordering
83
The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1972, Summary, John
R. Hicks, Kenneth J. Arrow, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1972/arrow/facts/.
84
KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951, 3rd. ed., 2012).
85
Adam Smith, Interview with Kenneth J. Arrow, at 39:19-38:29, Aug. 27, 2008, https://www.nobelprize.org/
prizes/economic-sciences/1972/arrow/interview/ (discussing theory of the firm).
86
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel H. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 405 (1983).
See also FRANK E. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL H. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 70
(1998) (same).
87
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 86, at 405, n.26; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 86, at 70,
n.15.
88
Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Arrow’s Theorem and the Exclusive Shareholder Franchise,
62 VAND. L. REV. 1219, 1229–43 (2009) (contesting the misguided argument citing Arrow’s theorem to justify
exclusive corporate franchise to shareholders by pointing out any shortcomings in that argument). See generally
GRANT M. HAYDEN & MATTHEW T. BODIE, RECONSTRUCTING THE CORPORATION: FROM SHAREHOLDER
PRIMACY TO SHARED GOVERNANCE 103–21 (2021) (critiquing in detail the argument that Arrow’s theorem
supports giving the corporate vote to shareholders only).
89
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 13, 557–58,
573 (2008)
90
KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 63–79 (1974).
91
Brett H. McDonnell, Professor Bainbridge and the Arrowian Moment: A Review of the New Corporate
Governance in Theory and Practice, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 139, 168 (2009) (stating “if anything, Arrow’s
argument, properly understood, calls Bainbridge’s own positions into doubt.”).
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over vectors. In other words, while we can tell which of two scalars or numbers
is larger, we cannot say whether the ordered pair (5, 3) is larger than the ordered
pair (6, 2). To conceive of stakeholder capitalism as the simultaneous
maximization of all stakeholder interests is thus problematic.
Instead, consider reframing stakeholder capitalism as the maximization of
the scalar of shareholder value subject to satisfying constraints about other
stakeholders’ interests being above some values. Such a corporate objective
function is a well-defined constrained maximization problem, which is
commonplace and standard in economic theory 92 and operations and supply
chain management. 93 A well-known concept in the calculus of several variables
is that of Lagrange multipliers, 94 which arise in solving the maximization of a
scalar-valued function of several variables subject to equality constraints. A
related important result in multivariable calculus is the Kuhn-Tucker theorem, 95
which provides necessary conditions for the maximization of a scalar-valued
function of several variables subject to inequality constraints, and is also known
now as the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker Theorem. 96 Much of modern economic theory
involves the solution of constrained optimization problems. 97 Consumers and
investors maximize their utility functions over consumption bundles and
portfolio choices, subject to intertemporal budget constraints. Producers
maximize profits, subject to technology constraints. Benevolent governments
maximize aggregate social welfare functions, subject to incentive compatibility
constraints.
VII. HOW ESG CONSTRAINTS GUIDE DIRECTOR DECISION-MAKING
Four other criticisms about stakeholder capitalism focus on how directors
make business decisions under stakeholder capitalism. 98 First, stakeholder
92

(1971).

See, e.g. MICHAEL D. INTRILLIGATOR, MATHEMATICAL OPTIMIZATION

AND

ECONOMIC THEORY

See, e.g., https://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/operations-management.asp/.
See, e.g., https://www.khanacademy.org/math/multivariable-calculus/applications-of-multivariable-derivatives/
constrained-optimization/a/lagrange-multipliers-examples.
95
Harold W. Kuhn & Albert W. Tucker, Nonlinear Programming, in PROCEEDINGS 2ND BERKELEY
SYMPOSIUM MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS AND PROBABILITY 481 (1951).
96
Saul I. Gass & Guillermo Owen, Harold W. Kuhn, in PROFILES IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH
INTERNATIONAL SERIES IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 529, 534 (2011); See generally
Richard W. Cottle, William Karush and the KKT Theorem, in OPTIMIZATION STORIES (Martin Grötschel ed.,
2012) 255–66; Harold W. Kuhn, Nonlinear Programming: A Historical View, in NONLINEAR PROGRAMMING 1–
26 (Richard W. Cottle & C. E. Lemke eds., 1976).
97
INTRILLIGATOR, supra note 92.
98
Robert T. Miller, How Would Directors Make Business Decisions Under a Stakeholder Model?, BUS.
L. (forthcoming 2022).
93
94
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capitalism disadvantages shareholders because other stakeholders have claims
from contract or law. 99 Second, under stakeholder capitalism, business decisions
are radically indeterminate due to lack of normative criteria to compare business
decisions. 100 Third, some of the normative criteria (such as Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency, or hypothetical bargains among stakeholders) that can be appended
to stakeholder capitalism do not resolve indeterminacy. 101 Finally, stakeholder
capitalism leads to directors making business decisions based politically on the
relative influence, lobbying, and rent-seeking of stakeholders and not rational,
normative considerations. 102
Conceptualizing stakeholder capitalism as shareholder capitalism subject to
mandatory ESG disclosures means that other stakeholders’ interests can be
viewed as constraints that corporate directors must satisfy while maximizing
shareholder value. Because ESG disclosures involve quantitative metrics,
corporate directors can set ESG targets to meet every quarter or year, similar to
earnings targets. This conceptualization of stakeholder capitalism provides clear
guidance to directors about how to make business decisions.
Shareholders are not disadvantaged relative to other stakeholders because
directors are still pursuing the goal of maximizing shareholder value, just now
considering other stakeholders’ interests by satisfying ESG constraints. Second,
under this version of stakeholder capitalism, business decisions are determined
by the normative criteria of maximizing shareholder value subject to ESG
constraints. Third, while other normative criteria may lead to radical
indeterminacy, maximizing shareholder value subject to ESG constraints does
not. Finally, maximizing shareholder value subject to ESG constraints is
apolitical as directors can set ESG targets as they choose to do so, similar to
earning targets.
What influences what directors choose as ESG targets? Community norms,
social norms, industry norms, media coverage, and reputation. Directors may
wish to generate negative corporate externalities because they believe not doing
so puts their company at a competitive disadvantage. Seeing their competitors
choose a publicly visible ESG target level may assure them not generating
negative corporate externalities does not disadvantage them competitively.
There might even be a race to the top as directors try for competitive advantage
to set more and more ambitious ESG targets to meet faster and faster. The market
99
100
101
102

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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forces of competition for those consumers and investors who care about ESG
issues can be powerful as the importance of ESG considerations grows in
society.
A study by proxy advisory firm Glass Lewis & Co. found that the American
companies tying executive incentive pay to ESG metrics increased from sixteen
percent in 2019 to twenty-five percent in 2021. 103 Examples of ESG metrices
tied to annual executive compensation include reduced carbon footprint, greater
women and minority representation on corporate boards, and increased
employee safety. 104 Examples of companies with executive bonuses linked to
ESG metrics include McDonalds, Chipotle, Chevron Corp., Marathon
Petroleum Corp., and Caterpillar Inc. 105 SEC Commissioner Allison Herren Lee
suggested that ESG statistics, such as those about diversity and climate, should
be included in SEC proposed “pay-versus-performance” rules requiring
companies to disclose how executive pay is related to corporate performance. 106
Many investors understandably desire transparency of how incentive pay is tied
to ESG goals and that such goals be specified in terms of non-manipulable,
publicly observable, quantifiable, verifiable, and well-defined ESG metrics. 107
For example, although employee happiness or subjective well-being (SWB) is
obviously an important ESG issue, the measurement of SWB is typically based
on voluntary self-reports and raises concerns about self-selection, interpersonal
comparability, privacy, and possibly health insurance. SWB measures are also
multi-dimensional, not unidimensional, 108 which raises aggregation and
distributive concerns.
VIII. GREED AS HOORAY FOR ME AND FRACK EVERYONE ELSE
The popular narrative that greed is not a vice and instead a virtue is
psychologically comforting and is even to a degree consistent with some
cherished American values, namely personal autonomy, freedom of choice,
rugged individualism, self-determination, and self-reliance. It is all far too
common today for many corporations to act without any concern for others and
believe that a system of perfectly competitive markets will magically transform
103
Lydia Beyoud, Executive Pay Tied to ESG Goals Grows as Investors Demand Action, BLOOMBERG L.,
Mar. 14, 2021.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Peter H. Huang, Subjective Well-Being and the Law, in HANDBOOK OF WELL-BEING (Ed Diener et al.
eds., 2018), https://www.nobascholar.com/chapters/56.
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greedy acts into some type of collective good. Unfortunately, this is neither what
modern economic theory predicts, nor very sadly what is borne out in reality.
Some corporations and people, have motivated beliefs in the social
desirability or virtue of greed in the sense of a Hooray for Me and Frack
Everybody Else (HFMAFEE) attitude. A recurring narrative in much of
American popular culture and American society is that HFMAFEE is a socially
desirable attitude. Another possible reason for HFMAFEE attitudes is zero-sum
thinking 109 due to a denial of win-win scenarios. 110
This Essay analyzes how to address the prevalence of HFMAFEE attitudes.
Holding corporations legally accountable for greed sends a powerful reminder
to corporations and other people that ESG unconstrained greed is disastrous and
ESG constrained greed is at least ESG constrained. Many corporations will and
some people may engage in greedy behavior if left ESG unconstrained. Many
believe that most state corporate law currently effectively requires corporations,
corporate boards, and corporate officers to act like sociopaths in their above-allelse, single-minded, obsessive, uncompromising, and zealous pursuit of
maximizing corporate profits without any care, compassion, concern, empathy,
or regard for people, our environment, and the world-at-large. According to the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM–V) of the
American Psychiatric Association, a human who behaves in such a ruthless,
obsessively compulsive manner has a highly anti-social psychopathic
personality. In a sense, mandatory ESG disclosures lead corporate actors to be
mindful 111 of how their corporate decisions have ESG impacts.
For many corporations, their HFMAFEE attitudes result from the metaphor
of an invisible hand that leads people’s, including those legal people known as
corporations’, the pursuit of their own so-called rational self-interest into a
coherent and even somehow socially desirable outcome. This oft-repeated
metaphor is at best incomplete, naïve, and subject to many important,
demanding, and substantive qualifications, while at worst socially corrosive,
divisive, harmful, and misleading. The narrative that markets convert greed into
social benevolence is quite popular in American society and popular media, yet
empirically false.
109
Lily Chernyak-Hai & Shai Davidai, “Do Not Teach Them How to Fish”: The Effect of Zero-Sum
Beliefs on Help Giving, J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. (forthcoming 2022).
110
Samuel G. B. Johnson et al., Win—Win Denial: The Psychology Underpinning of Zero-Sum Thinking,
151 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 455, 455 (2022).
111
Peter H. Huang, Can Practicing Mindfulness Improve Lawyer Decision-Making, Ethics, and
Leadership?, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 63 (2017) (extolling how mindfulness improves decision-making, ethics, and
leadership.
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IX. GREED IN AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE
The root of many of the world’s most important problems lies in the popular
narrative that greed is good. 112 This HFMAFEE attitude is at the root of a lot of
individual suffering and social misfortune. Authoritarianism, catastrophic global
climate change, crime, discrimination, extreme income inequality, famine,
incivility, political corruption, poverty, prejudice, rampant environmental and
noise pollution, skyrocketing health insurance costs, toxic forever chemicals,
and war all ultimately spring from a popular narrative that greed is not only
acceptable, but also even socially desirable. 113
Gordon Gekko, the fictional, notoriously ruthless and wealthy corporate
raider in the 1987 film Wall Street, 114 is infamous in Wall Street circles and
popular culture for a speech in which he impishly and shamelessly claimed,
“Greed, for lack of a better word, is good.” 115 The oft-misquoted, pithier,
popular, punchier, and shorter version of the statement is “greed is good.” 116
Ironically, unfortunately, and unintended by Wall Street director Oliver
Stone, a whole generation actually saw Gekko as a role model. 117 Accusing Fox
News Republican party Presidential debate co-moderator Megyn Kelly of bias
against him, Donald J. Trump skipped that debate, and instead held a counterdebate campaign rally at Drake University in Des Moines, Iowa, that doubled as
an event honoring veterans, 118 where Trump said, “My whole life I’ve been
greedy, greedy, greedy. I’ve grabbed all the money I could get. I’m so greedy.
But now I want to be greedy for the United States. I want to grab all that money.
I’m going to be greedy for the United States.” 119 Trump does not promise
compassion or empathy for economically and financially struggling people and

112
James Gamble, The Most Important Problem in the World, MEDIUM, Mar. 13, 2019, https://medium.
com/@jgg4553542/the-most-important-problem-in-the-world-ad22ade0ccfe.
113
Id.
114
WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox 1987).
115
Movieclips, Wall Street Movie CLIP–Greed is Good, YOUTUBE (Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=VVxYOQS6ggk (displaying video-clip of speech scene from WALL STREET (Twentieth Century
Fox 1987)).
116
https://www.shmoop.com/quotes/greed-is-good-misquote.html.
117
Kevin Polowy, ‘Greed is good’: Oliver Stone explains origin and relevance of classic ‘Wall Street’
line 30 years later, YAHOO! ENTERTAINMENT, Sept. 22, 2017, https://www.yahoo.com/entertainment/greedgood-oliver-stone-explains-origin-relevance-classic-wall-street-line-30-years-later-233048889.html.
118
Tara Golshan, Donald Trump actually skipped the debate, and it was “so much America”, VOX, Jan. 28,
2016, 10:42 pm EST, https://www.vox.com/2016/1/28/10866252/trump-counter-debate-so-much-america.
119
Erza Klein, Trump: “My whole life I’ve been greedy . . . Now I want to be greedy for the United States”,
VOX, Jan. 29. 2016, 8:30 am EST, https://www.vox.com/2016/1/29/10866388/donald-trump-greedy.
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instead, Trump does promise to be greedy for economically and financially
struggling people by grabbing money from some unspecified other people. 120
Both Gekko and his iconic speech are inspired by a speech Ivan F. Boesky,
a real-life risk arbitrage trader, gave in his legendary May 18, 1986
commencement address at the University of California at Berkeley School of
Business Administration. 121 What Boesky actually said to applause and laughter
seems cautious and restrained in comparison, namely: “Greed is all right, by the
way. I want you to know that. I think greed is healthy. You can be greedy and
still feel good about yourself.” 122 Just eight days after the release of the movie
Wall Street, Boesky received a prison sentence of three years upon his
conviction for conspiracy to file false stock trading records. 123 A year earlier,
Boesky paid a record $100 million fine for insider trading. 124
In the 2010 sequel Wall Street: Money Never Sleeps, 125 Oliver Stone revisits
Gekko’s character, and remixes the greed refrain by having Gekko say,
“Someone reminded me I once said I once said, ‘Greed is good’. Now it seems
it’s legal. Because everyone is drinking the same Kool-Aid.” 126 Ironically, after
being released from serving time in prison for insider trading and securities
fraud, Gekko wrote a book titled, Is Greed Good? To many people, the question
of whether greed is good remains unsettled. 127 The ethical and moral
ambivalence about greed persists to this day because greed is not only common,
it also can indeed have positive spillover effects. 128 An earlier generation of
120

Id.
John Paul Rollert, The Moral Ambivalence of Gordon Gekko, CHICAGOBOOTHREVIEW. https://review.
chicagobooth.edu/behavioral-science/2017/article/moral-ambivalence-gordon-gekko.
122
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123
James Sterngold, Boesky Sentenced to 3 years in Jail in Insider Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1987,
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/12/19/business/boesky-sentenced-to-3-years-in-jail-in-insider-scandal.html?
pagewanted=all.
124
Bob Greene, A $100 Million Idea: Use Greed for Good, CHI. TRIBUNE, Dec. 15, 1986, https://www.
chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1986-12-15-8604030634-story.html.
125
WALL STREET: MONEY NEVER SLEEPS (Twentieth Century Fox 2010).
126
Christine Kearney, “Money Never Sleeps” faces hard time on Wall Street, REUTERS, Sept. 22, 2010,
8:36 AM, https://www.reuters.com/article/film-us-wallstreet/money-never-sleeps-faces-hard-time-on-wall-street-idUKT
RE68L23320100922.
127
See, e.g., Kimberly Amadeo, Greed Is Good or Is It? Quote and Meaning, THE BALANCE, updated May
30, 2019, https://www.thebalance.com/greed-is-good-or-is-it-quote-and-meaning-3306247; Keith Lockitch, Is
Greed Good? IMPACT TODAY, AYN RAND INSTITUTE, Apr. 9, 2014, https://ari.aynrand.org/is-greed-good/; John
Paul Rollert, Greed is Good: A 300-Year History of a Dangerous Idea, THE ATLANTIC, Apr. 7, 2014,
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/04/greed-is-good-a-300-year-history-of-a-dangerous-idea/
360265/.
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See, e.g., Robert Greco, Greed, for lack of a better word, is good, ESSA, ECONOMICS STUDENT
SOCIETY OF AUSTRALIA, May 23, 2014, http://economicstudents.com/2014/05/greed-for-lack-of-a-better-wordis-good/.
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Americans, including Former Federal Reserve chair Alan Greenspan, was
heavily influenced by reading the works of novelist Ayn Rand on the virtues of
selfishness. 129 Finally, a recent spate of television shows depict many tragic
negative externalities from the greedy excesses of these infamous corporate
leaders and failed entrepreneurs, Theranos former CEO and founder Elizabeth
Holmes, Uber former CEO and founder Travis Kalanick, and WeWork former
CEO and founder Adam Neumann. 130
X. ADAM SMITH’S INVISIBLE HAND METAPHOR
For many corporations and some people, greedy behavior grows from the
seed of a common and self-serving misunderstanding of the narrative of an
invisible hand that leads individuals pursuing only their so-called rational selfinterest in so-called free markets to a collective outcome that has unintended
social benefits. 131 Scottish economist and moral philosopher Adam Smith
introduced the metaphor of, a narrative about, and phrase “an invisible hand” in
his 1759 book The Theory of Moral Sentiments 132 and more famously in his 1776
book The Wealth of Nations, in this oft-quoted passage from Book IV, Chapter
II, paragraph IX:
he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other
cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of
his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was not
part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of
the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.
I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade
for the public good. It is an affectation, indeed, not very common
among merchants, and very few words need be employed in
dissuading them from it. 133

The narrative that corporations and people ruthlessly maximizing their own
profits or market-gotten gains will, as if by magic, lead to economic outcomes
that are socially coherent and even proper in some sense is comforting and

129
Maria Bustillos, When Alan Met Ayn: “Atlas Shrugged” and Our Tanked Economy, THE AWL, Apr. 12, 2011,
https://www.theawl.com/2011/04/when-alan-met-ayn-atlas-shrugged-and-our-tanked-economy/.
130
See, e.g., Bryan Alexander, Why Hollywood is ‘Super Pumped’ for Epic Big-Business Flameouts of
WeWork, Theranos and Uber, USA TODAY, Feb. 28, 2022, https://www.usatoday.com/story/entertainment/tv/
2022/02/28/wecrashed-super-pumped-dropout-series-big-business-big-falls/6915152001/; Amanda Hess, Hollywood
Bets Big on the Bad Entrepreneur, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/05/arts/thedropout-super-pumped-wecrashed-moguls.html.
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consistent with the cherished American values of personal autonomy, freedom
of choice, rugged individualism, self-determination, and self-reliance. A more
complete version of Gekko’s monologue about greed is: “Greed is right. Greed
works. Greed clarifies and cuts through to the essence of the evolutionary
spirit.” 134 The idea of an invisible hand is counterintuitive because it suggests
that instead of anarchy and chaos, a form of noble spontaneous order arises from
the sum total of many selfish actions made without any regard for the common
good. Friedrich Hayek, 1974 economics Nobel laureate, 135 wrote about how a
spontaneous order, that he terms an extended order, economizes on information
and local knowledge. 136 Elinor Ostrom, 2009 economics Nobel laureate, 137
conducted field studies finding that people in small, local communities
managing shared natural resources (such as bodies of waters, forests, oil fields,
and pastures) are able over time to establish rules for the care and utilization of
common resources that are both economically and ecologically sustainable,
without any regulation by central authorities. 138
The narrative of an invisible hand implies that even though people and
corporations behave selfishly not caring about others, perfectly competitive
markets will transform such individual acts of selfishness into a social outcome
that even a fictitious benevolent central planner cannot improve upon in the very
particular and narrow sense due to the Italian economist, engineer, and
sociologist Vilfredo Pareto. Pareto defined an allocation of commodities to be
efficient or optimal if any reallocation of commodities that makes some
consumers better off also makes at least another consumer worse off. This
normative criterion has become known as Pareto efficiency or Pareto optimality
and it is a minimal and very weak optimality criterion because it says nothing
about equity, fairness, or justice of the market income distribution resulting from
some allocation of commodities. For example, if one person, say Dastardly, has
every commodity and nobody else has any commodity, this is a Pareto efficient
allocation because to make anybody besides Dastardly better off requires a
reallocation of some commodity to that person away from Dastardly. This
conclusion assumes that Dastardly has selfish preferences, in the sense that
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Dastardly only cares about Dastardly’s consumption and nobody else’s
consumption. People typically care about not only their own consumption, but
also some other people’s consumption (usually positively, though sometimes
negatively). Think of a couple in mutual love, such as William Shakespeare’s s
archetypal young lovers, Romeo and Juliet, in contrast with a long-time feuding
pair of families, such as American folklore’s the West Virginia Hatfields and the
Kentucky McCoys. Another way of conceptualizing this is that people’s
consumption preferences are interdependent or meddlesome. A final way of
describing this is as Other Regarding Preferences (ORPs).
XI. ARROW-DEBREU GENERAL COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS
Kenneth Arrow, 1972 economics Nobel laureate, 139 and Gerard Debreu,
1983 economics Nobel laureate, 140 mathematically analyzed the above simple
narrative of an invisible hand operating in a self-regulating way for an economic
system of perfectly competitive markets. The canonical, standard Arrow-Debreu
general competitive equilibrium model, 141 which all first-year economics
graduate students learn in their second semester, mathematically and precisely
formalizes the invisible hand narrative in the form of what are known to
economists as the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics. 142 The first
fundamental theorem of welfare economics proves that under certain strong
hypotheses, every competitive market equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient
and the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics proves that under
certain different strong hypotheses, every Pareto efficient allocation can be
realized as a competitive market equilibrium allocation upon a suitable
redistribution of initial endowments. 143 Most non-economists and sometimes
even some people who have studied economics fail to realize the Arrow-Debreu
model is not, and was never intended to be, descriptive of reality and instead it
is, and was intended to be, an idealized normative welfare benchmark.

139
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141
Kenneth J. Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy, 22
ECONOMETRICA 265 (1954).
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Kenneth J. Arrow, An Extension of the Basic Theorems of Classical Welfare Economics, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND BERKELEY SYMPOSIUM ON MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS AND PROBABILITY 508
(Jerzy Neyman ed., 1951); Gerard Debreu, Valuation Equilibrium and Pareto Optimum, 40 PROC. NAT’L ACAD.
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Additionally, the Arrow-Debreu model makes very strong assumptions,
including the condition that markets are complete, meaning that everything that
consumers value is traded on perfectly competitive markets and everything that
firms utilize as inputs and produce as outputs are traded on perfectly competitive
markets. Commodity market completeness is obviously not descriptive of any
known human society. For example, there are obviously, almost by definition,
no markets, let alone perfectly competitive markets, for compassion, empathy,
honesty, love, or trust. There are critically no markets for many forms of
pollution. Finally, there are no markets for trading with unborn generations.
The Arrow-Debreu model can be generalized to include time by introducing
the idea of dated commodities, that is commodities that are indexed by the date
of their delivery. Completeness of dated commodity markets is even more
unrealistic, even though some futures markets exist for commodities and stock
price indices. The Arrow-Debreu model can be further generalized to include
risky states of the world by introducing the idea of contingent commodities, that
is commodities indexed by the contingent state of the world under which they
are delivered. Each state of the world is a complete and exhaustive description
of the payoff-relevant riskiness and states of the world are mutually exclusive.
In other words, one and just one state of the world will be realized. Completeness
of contingent, dated commodity markets requires a whole lot of markets. If there
are 1, . . ., N commodities; 1, . . ., T dates; and 1, . . ., S states of the world, then
commodity market completeness requites existence of the product NxTxS
perfectly competitive contingent, dated commodity markets!
Arrow introduced the notion of perfectly competitive markets for securities
that pay out one dollar in each of the S possible states of nature and nothing
otherwise. 144 These S securities have since become known as Arrow securities.
Arrow security markets vastly reduce the number of required perfectly
competitive markets from the NxTxS Arrow-Debreu perfectly competitive
contingent, dated commodity markets to a set of NxT dated commodity markets
plus a set of S securities markets, one for each of the S possible states of the
world. The sum (NxT)+S is a lot smaller than the product NxTxS. Nonetheless,
Arrow knows that he is making a heroic assumption that there is completeness
of perfectly competitive security markets, meaning there is a set of S perfectly
competitive security markets. Real-world security markets are vastly incomplete
due in part to informational asymmetries from the well-known problems of
144
Kenneth J. Arrow, Le Rôle des Valeurs Boursières pour la Repetition la Meilleure des Risques 11
ECONOMETRIE 41 (1953) [The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-Bearing, 31 REV. ECON. STUD.
91 (1964)].
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adverse selection or hidden type and moral hazard or hidden decision in
insurance markets. For example, in health insurance, undisclosed genetic risks
or pre-existing conditions are hidden types, while undisclosed smoking or illegal
drug use are hidden actions.
XII. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM OF INCOMPLETE (SECURITY) MARKETS
There is by now a large mathematical economics literature about General
Equilibrium with Incomplete (GEI) security markets.145 As far as welfare
properties, it is a theorem that GEI allocations typically are Pareto inefficient. 146
This is unsurprising because when security markets are incomplete, there are
risks that cannot be reallocated through markets for insurance or speculation. A
weaker normative criterion defines an allocation to be constrained Pareto
efficient if a benevolent central planner can alter consumers’ consumption and
security portfolio allocations while being constrained to let existing incomplete
perfectly competitive security markets operate cannot improve on that initial
allocation. GEI allocations typically are constrained Pareto inefficient. 147 This
property that GEI allocations typically are constrained suboptimal means that a
benevolent central planner can impose suitable taxes on securities to improve on
a GEI allocation achieved with incomplete security markets. To be certain to
achieve such a Pareto improvement, the number of securities must exceed the
number of consumers because the necessary reallocations can only be achieved
for certain if there are as many instruments, namely taxes as objectives, namely
consumers’ utilities. 148
This Essay analyzes how to constrain corporate and personal greedy
behavior through the design of socially responsible corporate law. Because
people’s HFMAFEE attitudes and beliefs that other people also have the same
or similar HFMAFEE attitudes often stem in part from a misunderstanding of
what so-called free markets can do in terms of achieving socially desirable
outcomes, another important avenue for changing or disabusing people of their
HFMAFEE attitudes is teaching people some basic personal finance/economics
competencies and literacy. Helping people to develop personal finance/economics
competencies also has additional beneficial individual and social spillover
MICHAEL MAGILL & MARTINE QUINZII, 1 THEORY OF INCOMPLETE MARKETS (2002).
Oliver D. Hart, On the Optimality of Equilibrium When the Market Structure is Incomplete, 11 J. EcON.
THEORY 418 (1975).
147
John Geanakoplos & Heraklis Polemarchakis, Existence, Regularity, and Constrained Suboptimality
of Competitive Allocations When Markets are Incomplete, in 3 ESSAYS IN HONOR OF KENNETH ARROW 77
(Walter P. Heller et al. eds., 1986).
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Alessandro Citanna et al., The Taxation of Trades in Assets, 126 J. ECON. THEORY 299 (2006).
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benefits, including a better understanding of compound interest, credit cards,
retirement investing, 149 expense ratios, index funds, and social security taxes.
HFMAFEE attitudes are omnipresent in today’s culture and society. It has
become just a fact of life and modern reality to encounter people and
corporations behaving in anti-social ways. People who have HFMAFEE
attitudes often have such views because they see other people who have
HFMAFEE attitudes getting ahead of, and often at the expense of, those who do
not have HFMAFEE attitudes. In other words, some people hold HFMAFEE
attitudes because they see, or believe, many other people who hold HFMAFEE
attitudes succeed over those who do not have HFMAFEE attitudes and instead
play by the rules. Having HFMAFEE attitudes means not being constrained by
the rules of decency and ethics. HFMAFEE attitudes are divisive and corrosive.
HFMAFEE attitudes are anti-caring of, and anti-compassionate towards, others.
HFMAFEE attitudes also fail to acknowledge our mutual interdependence and
fail to recognize the power of collaboration. HFMAFEE attitudes also negate a
fundamental human need, that of belonging. Humans are social creatures and
HFMAFEE attitudes are ultimately anti-human and fundamentally antisocial. 150
The Business Roundtable announced on August 19, 2019, with much fanfare
and press, a new statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, moving away from
shareholder primacy to include a commitment to all stakeholders (including
customers, employees, communities, and suppliers), and signed by the CEOs of
181 companies. 151 The Council of Institutional Investors Response to the
Business Roundtable Statement on Corporate Purpose observed that:
“[A]ccountability to everyone means accountability to no one.” 152 A corporate
law commentator argued the Business Roundtable Statement on Corporate
Purpose is neither legally correct (because in Delaware where many American
corporations are incorporated, corporate boards of directors are legally obligated
by fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the shareholders directors) nor
necessary (because if corporate boards of directors believe taking into account
views or interests of customers, employees, communities, and suppliers

149
Peter H. Huang, Achieving American Retirement Prosperity by Changing Americans’ Thinking About
Retirement, 22 STAN. J.L., BUS. & FIN. 189 (2017).
150
RAJ SISODIA, JAG SHETH, & DAVID WOLFE, FIRMS OF ENDEARMENT: HOW WORLD-CLASS COMPANIES
PROFIT FROM PASSION AND PURPOSE (2nd. ed, 2014).
151
Business Round Table, Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, Aug. 19 2019, https://opportunity.
businessroundtable.org/ourcommitment/.
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COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, Council of Institutional Investors Responds to Business
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advances shareholders’ interests, then corporate boards of directors already have
the authority and power to do so). 153 A current volunteer director of the National
Center for Access to Justice and a retired, former corporate law firm partner,
Jamie Gamble, believes that his former clients’ employees, namely corporate
executives, “are legally obligated to act like sociopaths.” 154 Michael Moore
expressed a similar sentiment in his documentary film, The Corporation.155 The
Corporation applied the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
Fourth Edition (DSM-IV), which is a tool for psychiatrists and psychologists to
make diagnoses of human psychiatric illnesses, to corporations, and found
unsurprisingly that according to the DSM-IV, corporations display highly antisocial psychopathic “personalities.” 156
One possible rationale behind the Business Roundtable Statement on
Corporate Purpose is a public response to preempt such proposed federal
legislation as Senator Elizabeth Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act, 157 a bill
that includes contains a “constituency statute” that imposes on corporate boards
of directors a duty of “creating a general public benefit” with regard to a
corporation’s stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, and the
environment, and the interests of the enterprise in the long-term. 158
On one level, this Essay is a wake-up call for society to be (more) mindful
of ESG issues and HFMAFEE attitudes. We hope to convince people to pay
attention to ESG issues and HFMAFEE attitudes. As a 1972 recipient of the
Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, 159
Kenneth Joseph Arrow insightfully stated “there is clearly a real value to putting
an item on the agenda” 160 and that is once an item is on the agenda it has in a
153
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very real sense arrived and can no longer be ignored because it now commands
attention and genuine discussion as a bona fide, full-fledged part of the agenda.
Arrow was referring to how passage of the federal law that is known as the
Employment Act of 1946, 161 “amounted to nothing more than a statement that
full employment was at last on the Federal agenda; and many felt that this was
a hollow victory indeed. But those who opposed it so violently were not
deceived; in the long run, this recognition was decisive.” 162 Similarly, we are
placing ESG issues and HFMAFEE attitudes on the agenda of law professors, at
the very least, and hopefully society-at-large.
XIII. SLOWING ECONOMIC GROWTH AND GUIDED CIVIC REVIVAL
Such structural macroeconomic factors as aging populations, decreasing
innovation, increasing debt, and reallocation of production from goods to
services, combined with climate change and COVID-19 are likely to reduce
long-term economic growth in developed economies. 163 Such predictions differ
from earlier predictions of slower economic growth based on physical 164 or
social limits to growth. 165 Some sustainability scientists even advocate “slower
growth, stagnation or de-growth is an environmental imperative, especially in
developed countries.”
Regardless of whether planned or not, slower economic growth is novel to
developed democracies and will cause fiscal and social stresses in terms of more
unemployment, fewer economic opportunities, greater economic inequality,
increasing household debt, lower retirement saving and investment, less
education, rising mental health concerns, higher economic anxieties, greater
family challenges, worsening of women’s economic and subjective well-being,
declining social trust, and surging ethnic conflicts. 166 Several researchers
propose a way to address these difficulties is the notion of “guided civic
revival.” 167 Specifically, guided civic revival entails a combination of
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governments and grassroots efforts intending to “strengthening key democratic
institutions and freedoms, increasing return on investment (ROI) in public
spending and taxation, increasing economic opportunity for youth, reducing
inequality and increasing social solidarity (perhaps especially in multicultural
democracies)” 168 all to decouple the current link between economic growth and
subjective well-being. 169 The regulatory proposal of mandatory ESG disclosures
can play a role in guided civic revival by helping consumers, corporations,
employees, investors, and society focus more on ESG issues and less on stock
prices.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has analyzed how to solve the problem of how to realize
diversity, sustainability, and stakeholder capitalism, namely mandatory ESG
disclosures. This Essay has also analyzed how to solve the problem of many
corporations and people having HFMAFEE attitudes, namely mandatory ESG
disclosures. The success of mandatory ESG disclosures will require working out
details of accountability, comparability, measurement, norms, and
standardization. Mandatory ESG disclosures will send a signal the SEC means
business about ESG issues. Finally, mandatory ESG disclosures are the least
radical way of radically repairing the current and misguided form of shareholder
capitalism. This is because mandatory ESG disclosures make use of the current
and dominant federal securities regulatory paradigm of mandatory disclosures.
Nonetheless, adding ESG disclosures effectuates a fundamental shift from
shareholder capitalism to stakeholder capitalism.
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